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                                             Abstract 
In this work, we use the VAR and space-state methodology to 
analyze how the recent developments in 20 European countries have 
modified  the  dynamics  of  structural  shocks.  Our  results  confirm  a 
visible progress in (predominated output fluctuations) supply shocks 
convergence  between  the  CEECs  and  the  euro  zone,  but  also 
corroborate  a  positive  initial  impact  of  EMU  creation  and  EU 
enlargement  supply  shocks  correlation.  In  particular,  we  find  that 
Croatia,  Poland,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia  are  good  candidates  to  the 
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1.  Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis that has spread across the world has brought in the 
foreground,  once  again,  the  discussion  about  the  pros  and  cons  of  the  euro  adoption  by 
Central and Eastern countries (CEECs hereafter). In particular, the vulnerabilities of CEECs 
during the current crisis has highlighted how to be part of European Monetary Union could be 
more  favorable  during  period  of  severe  downturns,  in  terms  of  monetary  and  financial 
stability.  On the other hand, having an addition independent tool of policy (i.e. monetary 
policy) could be precious to face the current downturn. In the literature, the benefits and 
especially the costs of monetary integration have been widely discussed since the pioneering 
works  of Mundell  (1961), McKinnon  (1963) and Kenen (1969).  Indeed, one of the most 
important costs put forward by the literature is linked to the probability of asymmetric shocks 
occurrence when the monetary and exchange rate policies are no longer a national issue. So, 
in the case when a country is hit by asymmetric shocks, its exchange rate will no longer 
generate an adjustment in relative international prices to compensate for output losses and 
restore equilibrium (Mundell, 1961).  
The  occurrence  of  asymmetric  shocks  depends  on  factors  such  as  similarity  of 
production structure, economic openness, business cycles (as) synchronization, but also on the 
efficiency  of  other  that  exchange  rate  mechanism
2  to deal with idiosyncratic shocks (De 
Grauwe,  2005).  Moreover,  the  susceptibility  to  asymmetric  shocks  changes  over  time. 
Monetary  integration  can  lead  to  greater  business  cycles  synchronization  and  therefore 
decreases incidence of asymmetric shocks or,  a contrario, to greater sectoral specialization 
increasing  the  probability  of  asymmetric  shocks.  The  first  view  is  represented  by  the 
European Commission. According to it, the single market leads to greater trade integration 
                                                           
2 Such as prices and wages flexibility, labor force mobility, portfolios’ diversification or fiscal and structural 




and this structure of trade (intra-industry) to the situation where most shocks will have similar 
effects on aggregate demand, so to greater shocks symmetry
3. The second view supported by 
Paul Krugman stipulates that trade integration leads to “regional concentration of industrial 
activities”, higher sectoral specialization and greater shocks asymmetry across a monetary 
union members
4. 
However, the usefulness of national monetary policy and in particular exchange rate is 
especially conditioned on the types of shocks affecting the economy and a flexible exchange 
rate is better suited to deal with real than nominal shocks (the Mundell -Fleming framework). 
Moreover, even if the ability of exchange rate mechanism to absorb the asymmetric shocks 
can be “weaker than the traditional (Keynesian) OCA theory has led us to believe
5” (De 
Grauwe, 2005), national structural and institutional differences and divergence movement in 
national  output  and  prices  are  not  going  to  disappear  with  euro  adoption.  Indeed,  the 
independent monetary and exchange rate policies will still be needed to assist in the national 
adjustments. So, to assess the cost of giving up monetary and exchange independence, we 
need to analyze the types of shocks hitting the economy and the degree of their – shocks and 
economic response to the shocks - asymmetry.   
The  main  objective  of  this  work  is  to  study  the  abovementioned  issues  for  the  11 
CEECs during the 1995-2007 period.  Indeed, we think that, even if this topic was relatively 
well  explored  at  the  begging  the  2000s,  the  recent  developments  make  interesting  a  re-
                                                           
3  This  view  is  often  associated  with  the  “endogeneity”  hypotheses  of  the  Optimum  Currency  Area  criteria 
stressing a strong relationship between economic (trade) integration and shocks correlation. See for example 
Frankel and Rose (1997); or recently Furceri and Karras (2008). See table 4 and A-2 (in Appendix) for business 
cycles and trade integration data. 
4 See for example Krugman (1991, 1993). 
5 According to the modern OCA theory, exchange rate is better suited to deal with temporary than permanent 
shocks since it has   usually no permanent effect on output and unemployment. Thus, even in the case of 
temporary shock, the use of exchange rate can be costly in term of a higher long -term rate of inflation. 
Moreover, the independent monetary and exchange rate policies can be come a source of asymmetric shocks 
since in an uncertain world exchange rate fluctuations are often driven by other than economic fundamentals 
(Mundell, 1973). For an analysis of exchange rate as shocks-absorber or source see Canzoneri (1996), Gros and 




assessment of the asymmetric shocks’ analysis. Moreover, compared to previous research, we 
dispose of a larger data span to conduct more detailed study on the subject. This let us to 
exclude the very first years of the CEECs’ structural transformation that have a biasing impact 
on the estimations.  
In details, the paper studies (i) the dynamics of the structural shocks convergence in the 
CEECs’  economies  taking  into  account  the  initial  impact  of  EU  adhesion
6;  (ii)  and 
comparing
7 the CEECs’ situation with the actual EMU countries before euro adoption (1990-
1999); (iii) and finally, the effect of 10-years monetary integration on the shock asymmetry in 
the actual euro zone members, to derive some implications for the potential future euro zone 
members.   
  More precisely, our approach consists of three steps:  
(i)  First, we identify three types of the structural shocks affecting the economies 
by  using  a  conventional  structural  vector  autoregressive  (VAR)  model  and  the 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) restrictions as developed by Clarida and Gali (1994).  
(ii)  Secondly,  we  estimate  a  space-state  model  by  applying  the  Kalman  filter 
technique  as  initiated  by  Boone  (1997)  to  obtain  the  dynamics  of  the  shocks’ 
convergence for two - CEECs’ and EMU - areas.  
(iii)  Finally,  we  estimate  the  impulse-response  functions  for  each  countries  and 
euro zone to study their responses to symmetrical shocks and therefore their national 
peculiarities (the speed of adjustment to the shocks).  
                                                           
6 This is only possible for the 8 CEECs that jointed the EU in May 2004. For the remaining countries, except 
Croatia, we dispose only of four quarters to evaluate the impact of the EU adhesion that is why we consider the 
year 2004 as our “breaking point” for a whole analysis.   
7  The degree of structural shocks asymmetry such as others criteria of the OPA is a particularly difficult subject 
to deal with. Indeed, there is no universal threshold value that lets determine if a country can or cannot join the 
common currency area. The usual way to tackle this problem consists of comparison with the previous 




Our results  confirm  a visible progress  in  (predominated output fluctuations) supply 
shocks convergence between the CEECs and the euro zone, but also corroborate a positive 
initial  impact  and EU enlargement in  May  2004 on almost  all countries,  even those that 
integrated the EU in January 2007. We also found significant similarity between the CEECs’ 
economies and the EMU members’ reactions to structural shocks. However since 2006, an 
increasing divergence in supply shocks could be noticed in some countries, especially for 
Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  the  Baltic  Republics.  But  positive  impact  of 
monetary  integration  may  accelerate  convergence  process  at  least  in  the  case  of  supply 
shocks. Indeed, the EMU members still present, as is the case of the CEECs, a significant real 
shocks asymmetry that has not disappeared as nominal one with euro adoption.  
In all, when the dynamics of structural shocks is analyzed, four of studied countries 
seem to be good candidates to euro adoption: Croatia (if EU adhesion increases supply shocks 
symmetry), Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. However, for all countries a greater alignment of 
fiscal  policy  (greater  real  shocks  symmetry)  will  be  necessary  to  decrease  the  cost  of 
economic adjustment
8.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews  briefly the existing 
literature. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and data used. Section 4 discusses 
the results and their implications. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Literature Review on Structural Shocks (A) Symmetry in the CEECs. 
When  we  analyze  studies  on  structural  shocks  (a)  symmetry  between  the  CEECs’ 
economies and the euro zone, there is possible to distinguish at least two types of approaches. 
Following table (Table 1) regroups some of them.  
                                                           
8 On the impact of fiscal convergence on business cycle synchronization and stabilization costs see Darvas and 




Table 1: Selected works on structural shocks correlation between the CEECs  
and euro zone 
Authors/ Countries  Method 
Data 
Frequency 
Reference  Results 
Horvath (2001), 
BG, CZR, ES, HU, LA, 
LI, PL, SR, SL 






GER, IT, UK) 
High Correlation 
Frankel and Nickel (2002) 
BG, CZR, ES, HU, PL, 
SR, SL 








Fidrmuc and Korhonen 
(2003), all CEECs except 
Croatia 







GER, FRA, IT 
High Correlation 
Artis et al.(2004) 






cycles except PL, HU 
Darvas and Szapary 









cycles except CZR, SR 
Babeski et al., 2004, all 
CEECs except Croatia 









convergence, Real shocks 
divergence 
 
Source: adapted from Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004), Ben Arfa (2009) 
The first group focuses on shocks (a) symmetry measuring business cycles correlation 
between  two  areas.  Indeed,  business  cycles  divergence  indicates  (temporary)  shocks 
asymmetry (De Grauwe, 2005). The authors calculate therefore the correlation coefficients of 
(real)  GDP  and  inflation  (Fidrmuc  and  Korhonen,  2004),  of  industrial  production  and 
unemployment cyclical components obtained by filtering techniques (Hodrick-Prescott, Band-
pass filer; Darvas and Szapary, 2004). Their results are sometimes mitigated but indicate, in 
general, a growing business cycles convergence between the CEECs and euro zone. 
Second  group  of  studies  concentrates  on  structural  shocks  correlation  using  the 
approach developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) and then by Clarida and Gali (1994) 




shocks identification to assess the degree of their (a) symmetry (Horvath, 2001; Frenkel and 
Nickel,  2002;  Fidrmuc  and  Korhonen,  2004).  In  general,  authors’  findings  suggest  that 
smaller CEECs’ economies are more affected by nominal shocks that the bigger countries. 
Their mostly static analyses confirm a significant shocks asymmetry for many of the CEECs. 
To  our  knowledge,  there  are  only  few  studies  treating  structural  shocks  in  the  new  EU 
countries from the dynamics point of view (Babecki et al., 2003). Their results show the 
progressive  convergence  in  nominal  shocks,  but  also  the  increase  in  supply  asymmetry 
between the studies economies.  Some elements of these last approaches are also used in this 
work.  
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Identifying structural shocks 
To identify the types of the structural shocks, we apply the Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
long-term restrictions as developed by Clarida and Gali (1994) to estimate a trivariate VAR 




The method developed by Clarida and Galí (1994) is based on a stochastic version 
(Obstefild,  1985)  of  the  open  macroeconomic  model  that  presents  the  standard  Mundell-
Fleming-Dornbush  results  in  the  short-run  and  the  characteristics  of  macroeconomic 





In the short run when the prices are “sluggish
9”, the demand determined level of output 
(1), difference between actual and market clearing price levels (2) and the ratio of price to 
foreign price levels (3) are written as follows: 
 
?? = ??
? +  ? + 𝜎 𝜐 1 − ?  𝑣? − ?? + ????                                        (1) 
?? = ??
? + 𝜐  1 −  ?  𝑣? − ?? + ????                                                      (2) 
?? = ??
? +  1 −  ?  𝑣? − ?? + ????                                                        (3) 
   
And all three shocks
10 - supply (??), real demand (??) and nominal (𝑣?) - influence 
contemporaneously the levels of all three of the system's variables – output (??), the real 
exchange rate (??), and prices (??). However, because output, the real exchange rate, and 
prices  are  expected  to  converge  to  their  flexible  price  equilibrium  levels,  the  system  is 
triangular in the long run. Only supply shocks influence the level of relative national outputs 
in the flexible price equilibrium, while both supply and real demand shocks affect the level of 
the real exchange rate
11. Finally, all shocks influence the ratio of home to foreign price levels 







                                                           
9  1 − ?  represents the degree of prices stickiness.  
10 Real supply shocks (AS) describes productivity and demographic shocks. Real demand shocks (IS) include 
shocks such as government -spending or changes in fiscal policy.  Nominal demand shocks (LM) include 
monetary and financial shocks such as changes in mon ey supply and in liquidity preferences, shifts in money 
velocity, in risk premia or financial liberalization or speculative currency attacks.  
11 The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of non -tradables to tradables. So, for example, an 
increase in government spending (real demand shocks) that falls heavily on no-tradables, leads to an appreciation 
through its impact on the relative prices (Rogoff, 1992). 
12  According to the authors, these plausible restrictions should also hold in many other  specifications of 
stochastic open macro equilibrium, for example in the cash -in-advance Arrow-Debreu open macro models 




Structural VAR and shocks identification 
We can use the above-mentioned restrictions to identify structural shocks affecting the 
CEECs’ economies
13.  




















                               (4) 
              
We assume that the natural logarithms of real GDP (??), the real effective exchange 
rate (?????) and consumer price index (??) follow a stationary stochastic process responding 
to three orthogonal shocks: real supply (???), real demand (???) and nominal demand (?𝑚?) 
shocks.  
The theoretical model implies that variables are non-stationary in level and stationary 
in first differences, and that variables are not cointegrated.  
The structural VAR model can be written as a moving average as follows:  
𝑋? = 𝐴0?? + 𝐴1??−1 + ⋯ =   𝐴???−?
∞
?=0 = 𝐴 𝐿  ??                        (5), 
where 𝑋? represents a vector of difference of output, the real exchange rate and prices, 
?? is a vector of three orthogonal shocks and 𝐴? is the matrices transmitting the effects of 
these shocks to the variables as indicated by the long-term restrictions above (4), and 𝐿 is the 
                                                           
13 Indeed, another important advantage of the Blanchard-Quah approach is the fact that we can identify the 
shocks using their long term properties, and at the same time, the short- and medium term dynamics can be 
estimated. For example, in the short run positive supply and demand shocks increase relative output. A positive 
real  demand  shock  increase  relative  demand  and,  since  prices  are  sticky,  appreciate  real  exchange  rate.  A 
positive nominal demand shocks lowers the domestic interest rate and depreciates exchange rate.  In our VAR 
methodology these dynamics can be analyzed using variance decomposition and generating impulse response 




lag operator. Since, the variables are stationary it is possible to estimate the reduced form of 
the VAR model:  
𝑋? = ?? + 𝐶1??−1 + ⋯ =  𝐶???−?
∞
?=0
= 𝐶 𝐿  ??              (6) 
The following relationship can be established between the residuals of the structural 
and  reduced  forms  of  VAR  models:  ?? = 𝐴0??.  However,  since  the  model  (6)  is  under-
identified  it  is  not  possible  to  estimate  the  matrix  𝐴0  and  obtain  ??  without  additional 
restrictions.  First  restrictions  are  imposed  on  the  structural  shocks  that  are  mutually 
orthogonal and each has unit variance (𝐴0𝐴0
′ = Ω). The additional Blanchard-Quah “long-
term”  restrictions  are  then  imposed  on  the  matrix 𝐴1.  Knowing  that 𝐴1 = 𝐶1𝐴0,  we  can 
identify the structural matrix 𝐴0 and recover structural shocks to assess how the degree of 
asymmetry between them changes over time. 
3.2. Estimating structural shocks convergence. 
To  analyze  the  structural  shocks  convergence,  we  estimate  a  dynamic  space-state 
model using the Kalman filter technique (Boone, 1997). More precisely, we  estimate the 
following measurement equation of the model: 
 ??
? − ??
?) = ?? + ??   ??
? − ??
?  + 𝜔?                            (7), 
where ?? represents the previously identified real and nominal structural shocks. Superscripts 
i  denotes  each  of  the  CEECs,  j  denotes  the  euro  zone  and  k-  the  rest  of  the  world, 
approximated  by  the  United  States  of  America  (USA).    ?? and  ??  are  time-varying 
coefficients, whose dynamics are described by the following transition equation of the model:  
?? = ??−1 + 𝜇1?              (8) 




𝜔? and  𝜇?  are independent and normally distributed error terms with zero mean (R) and a 
constant variance (Q). 
We assume that shocks asymmetry between the CEECs and the euro zone decreases, 
i.e. there is a growing convergence between the shocks of two zones, if the coefficient ?? 
tends toward zero. In this case, shocks affecting the CEECs are entirely explained by shocks 
touching  the  euro  zone.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  coefficient  ??  tends  toward  one  the 
asymmetry between two areas increases as shocks hitting the CEECs are more and more 
explained by shocks affecting the rest of the world
14.  
Moreover, to estimate the model, we establish two previous conditions. First, given that 
the starting value of the transition coefficients and those of the variance-covariance matrix of 
the transition equation are necessary, we perform the OLS estimation to assess them (Zhang 
et al., 2005). 
Secondly, it is important to note that the “signal-to-noise ratio”, which is the ratio of the 
variance  of  residuals  from  the  transition  and  measurement  equations  (Q/R),  has  a  great 
influence on the estimation results. So, its value must be set in such way as not to put too 
much of the explanatory power on unobservable variables (Q large) and to avoid estimating 
the time-varying coefficients  as  constants  (Q  small). Generally, the  Q/R  ratio is  included 
between 0.1 and 0.4 (Boone, 2000). In doing so, the model equations fit rather well the real 
economic  relations  and  the  estimations  of  unobservable  variables  are  relatively  smooth. 
Testing different possibilities, we set the Q/R ratio at 0.1 for all countries
15 . 
 
                                                           
14 If the model is correctly specified, the time-varying coefficient ?? should tend toward zero or remain stable at 
a  low  level.  It  should  be  noticed  that  we  use  a  smoothing  procedure  in  our  estimations,  which  makes  the 
estimates of ?? less likely to be stationary (see also Cortinhas, 2006). 




3.3. Data, variables and estimation periods 
We  use  quarterly  data  provided  by  the  IMF’s  International  Financial  Statistics.  A 
common strategy used in the literature is to use of annual data to iron out short-term cyclical 
fluctuations,  but  our  estimation  periods  for  the  CEECs  is  too  short.  Indeed,  the  analysis 
covers
16 the period 1990 (Q1) - 1997 (Q4) for the 9 euro zone countries and the period 1995 
(Q1) - 2007 (Q4) for the 11 CEECs.  Th e euro zone countries include: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal  and  Spain,  and  the  CEECs 
include: Bulgaria, Croatia (estimation period starts in first quarter 1997), the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania (estimation period starts in first quarter 
1997), Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The variables are pre-tested for the presence of unit roots, applying the Augmented - 
Dickey-Fuller and  Perron-Phillips tests
17, which fail to reject the nu ll hypothesis of a unit 
root in levels, while reject the null of a unit root in first differences.   The cointegration 
(Johansen procedure) tests indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be 
rejected at any conventional level of significan ce. We chose two lags estimation for the 
CEECs and fourth lags estimations for the actual euro zone countries on the basis of the lag 
length tests using Akaike and Schwarz information criteria and for the homogeneity reason. 
 The data are expressed in loga rithmic terms and the model is estimated in fourth 
differences to avoid seasonality. Following the literature we focus our analysis on standard 
                                                           
16 Since sources of nominal asymmetry tend to disappear with the monetary integration, the dynamics of nominal 
shocks is analyzed far as a country does not become member of the EMU (Table 4 in Appendix for the evolution 
of the CEECs’ exchange rate regimes) 





variables such as the real GDP, the consumer price index and real effective exchange rate. 
Real GDP is computed using the GDP deflator provided by the IFS database
18. 
 
4.  Results 
      4.1. CEECs: Dynamics of asymmetric shocks  
The following figures (Figure 1) report the evolution of structural shocks convergence 
between the euro zone and CEECs. 
 
Supply shocks 
When  looking  at  the  CEECs’  supply  shocks  convergence  toward  the  euro  zone,  a 
general increasing trend can be remarked over the 1999-2005/2006 period, with a stabilization 
phase in 2003 and in 2007. This is particularly visible after the initial growing divergence 
between the two zones during the second half of the 1990’s.  
From the individual country point of view, some interesting evolution can be noticed. 
For example, Croatian supply shocks have shown the most persistence divergence over the 
2001- 2006 (Q2) period. In Estonia, a visible increasing divergence can be remarked during 
the first semester of 2000 and since the beginning of 2003. In Hungary, after the years of 
increasing convergence toward the EMU level, supply shocks have started to diverge since 
the  second  quarter  of  2005.  For  all  countries  except  Croatia  and  Poland,  an  increase  in 
                                                           
18 We decide not to transform the original data into relative variables to capture asymmetric shocks for the 
obvious reason that the former do not take into account propagation mechanism and individual country reaction 




shocks’ divergence or at least more stable pattern has been visible since the beginning of 2006 
and during 2007
19. 
Real demand shocks 
In the first period under study, it is possible to distinguish two phases: (i) increasing 
convergence between 1997-1999/2000, (ii) heterogeneous divergence after 2001. However, 
after 4 years of growing asymmetry, the real demand shocks convergence between the CEECs 
and the euro zone has been increasing since the second or third quarter of 2004 until the end 
of 2006. Since then the convergence pattern has remained stable or lightly decreased. It is 
worth to notice that, since 2003, Hungarian real demand shocks have been more affected by 
the rest of the word than the EMU, but also that Polish real demand shocks have shown the 
most visible convergence with those of the EMU countries. In all, real demand shocks are 
more asymmetric that the real supply ones.    
Nominal demand shocks 
 In general, the convergence of the CEECs’ nominal demand shocks toward those of 
the euro zone has been increasing over the period of study (Figure 3). In particular, it is 
possible to notice a visible acceleration in the CEECs’ nominal shocks convergence since the 
beginning  of  1998  (for  some  countries  since  the  beginning  of  2002),  but  also  a  visible 
deceleration  since  2005/2006.  Looking  more  into  details,  three  different  patterns  can  be 
distinguished: (i) growing and persistent convergence (the coefficient beta has remained close 
to zero) with stabilization phase for Estonia, Hungary,  Lithuania and Latvia; (ii) growing 
convergence  following  an  increase  in  divergence  since  2004/2005  for  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia; (iii) and an increase in divergence since 2000 for the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia. 
                                                           
19 The individual time-varying coefficients of structural shocks are presented in Appendix (Table A-3). Figure 1:  Convergence of Supply Shocks toward the Euro Zone as opposed to the USA: CEECs 
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Figure 2:  Convergence of Real Demand Shocks toward the Euro Zone as opposed to the USA: selected CEECs 
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Figure 3:  Convergence of Nominal Shocks toward the Euro Zone as opposed to the USA: CEECs 
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Types of shocks affecting the CEECs’ economies 
The following table (Table 2) reports the variance decomposition of output, the real exchange 
and prices at the 10-quarters horizon that can be attributed to each structural shocks.  
For all countries, the variability in output (first line) is explained in large part by real supply 
shocks (AS). Their shares in total variance vary from 52 percent in Bulgaria and Poland to 98 
percent in Latvia. For the other countries, supply shocks explain about 80 percent of the variability 
in output. Demand –nominal and real – shocks explain usually a small part in total output variation.  
Table 2: Variance Decomposition for the CEECs’ economies 
  Bulgaria  Croatia  Czech Rep.  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia 
Shocks  AS   IS  LM    AS   IS  LM   AS   IS  LM    AS  IS  LM  AS  IS  LM  AS  IS  LM 
Real GDP    52   19  29     93   2    5    87    2    11    84    9    7     84   3    12    98   1     1 
REER    48   19  17     52  45   3    15   72   13    87   10   3     7     93   0    77   21   2 
Prices    71   12  17     29  25   46    80   10    9    1     21   78     25   5    70    97   0     2 
  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia  Euro Zone 
Shocks  AS   IS  LM    AS   IS  LM   AS   IS  LM    AS  IS  LM  AS  IS  LM  AS  IS  LM 
  Real GDP   80    4     7    53   39   8    88    6    6    82   4     14    92   3     5    91   2    6 
REER   36    53   11    33   66   1    4     95   2    9     72   19    6     91   3    3    58   39 
Prices   17    24   59    50   5    45    75   16   9    23   31   47    83   6     11    4    54   42 
   AS describes Real Supply Shocks, IS – Real Demand Shocks, and LM –Nominal Demand Shocks 
    Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
However, some exceptions can be remarked. For example, in Bulgaria the role of nominal 
shocks is relatively more important (29 percent) than in the other CEECs (5-14 percent). In Poland, 
the real demand shocks explain 39 percent of output fluctuation comparing to 2-6 percent for the 
other countries. These last findings are particularly interesting when we compare them with the 
dynamics of structural shocks. For example, it is possible to notice a visible convergence in real 
supply shocks in the case of Poland and Slovenia (until 2007). However, while Slovenian economy 
is in large part affected by supply shocks (92 percent), Polish economy is much less (53 percent). 
Indeed, real demand shocks account for 39 percent of the variation in Polish output. Fortunately, 




case, it could become rather problematic since the frequency of fiscal policy shocks contrary to 
nominal ones is not going to disappear with the euro adoption.  
 
Adjustment to structural shocks 
Another necessary criterion to determine whether a country can give up its monetary and 
exchange rate policies is the speed with which the economy adjusts to common structural shocks. 
The estimation of impulse-response functions (Figure 4) shows a rather similar adjustment pattern 
of the CEECs economies and the euro zone to real supply shocks (except Bulgaria).  
More  precisely,  the  adjustment  of  output  to  a  supply  shock  is  similar  or  even  faster  in 
Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. Indeed, almost 80 to 90 % of long term level of aggregate 
response  to  a  supply  shocks
20  is archived after 4 periods. In the case of the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia adjustment to a supply shock is much slower (less that 50% after 4 
quarters). For the remaining countries, Estonia and Latvia, the output response to a supply shocks is 
much more volatile. The adjustment to demand shocks is comparably slow in almost all studied 
countries, except Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, where the long -term (zero) level is 
reached after 10 or 14 periods.  
                                                           
20 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) proposed this measure, i.e. the value of aggregated impulses after some period of 
time in comparison to the long-run level of the responses,  to decide whether  response of a economy to common shocks 




Figure 5: The Impulse-Response Functions: the CEECs and the Euro Zone 
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Figure 6: The Impulse-Response Functions: the actual EMU members and the Euro Zone 
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Despite  some differences in the adjustment of output to structural shocks, the response of the 
CEECs follow more similar pattern to that of the euro zone, especially when comparing to some of 
the actual EMU members (Figure 5). For example, in the case of the Netherlands and Spain, the 
adjustment of output to a supply shocks is slower than in the case of other members. Moreover, 
Spanish output is dominated more by nominal than by supply shocks.  
In the next two sections, we compare the correlation of the shocks for the CEECs with the 
actual EMU members in the period before the euro adoption, first from the static then from dynamic 
point of view. This analysis can shed some light on how well prepared (in terms of stabilization 
costs) are CEECs countries compared with the actual EMU members. 
 
        4.2. Are the CEECs ready for the euro? 
In the following table (Table 3) we present the correlation of the three types of shocks for the 
EMU countries during the period 1990-1998 and the CEECs during the period 1998-2007. Focusing 
first on supply shocks (second column) we can see that the CEECs showed, except Poland and 
Slovenia, similar or even more important correlation than some of the EMU countries
21. Looking at 
real  demand  shocks  (third  column)  we  can  observe  mor e  asymmetric  development.  Indeed, 
correlation coefficients between the CEECs and euro zone are in general negative, except in 
Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia, while in the EMU countries only Finish and Spanish real demand 
shocks were asymmetric during the pr e-adhesion phase. Finally, a different pattern emerges for 
nominal demand shocks (fourth column).  
 
 
                                                           
21 However, it is worth to remind that despite these positive correlation coefficients, convergence of supply shocks has 




Table 3: Shocks Correlation during the pre-adhesion period:  
the EMU members and CEECs 
Q1 :1990-Q4 :1998  Real Supply Shocks  Real Demand Shocks  Nominal Demand Shocks 
Austria  0.16  0.15  0.34 
Belgium  0.16  0.44  0.43 
Finland  0.09  -0.07  0.36 
France  0.17  0.25  0.04 
Germany  0.51  0.14  0.59 
Italy  -0.02  0 .12  0.35 
Netherlands  0.18  0.03  0.22 
Portugal  0.09  0.36  0.08 
Spain  -0.03  -0.18  0.32 
Q1 :1995-Q4 :2007  Real Supply Shocks  Real Demand Shocks  Nominal Demand Shocks 
Bulgaria  0.10  -0.08  0.19 
Croatia  -0.05  0.23  0.11 
Czech Rep.  0.05  -0.35  0.10 
Estonia  0.43  0.06  -0.16 
Hungary  0.26  0.12  -0.04 
Latvia  0.08  -0.20  0.19 
Lithuania  0.31  -0.04  0.53 
Poland  -0.25  -0.03  0.20 
Romania  0.17  -0.26  -0.05 
Slovakia  0.05  -0.07  -0.12 
Slovenia*  -0.37  0.17  0.27 
*Q1 :1995-Q4 :2006 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In particular, nominal shocks are highly correlated for Lithuania, but also for Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Poland. For the other CEECs, especially Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, correlation 
coefficient are low and negative. In general, nominal shocks in the CEECs are less correlated than 
in the EMU countries before the euro adoption.   
 
Impact of the EU enlargement on shocks correlation  
In the following table (Table 4, lower part) we report the correlation coefficients before and 




Table 4: Impact of the euro adoption and the EU enlargement on shocks
22 correlation: 
the EMU members and the CEECs’ economies. 
 













Austria  0.69  0.58  0.16  0.34  0.15  0.50 
Belgium  0.46  0.76  0.16  0.63  0.44  0.67 
Finland  -0.22  0.81  0.09  0.48  -0.07  -0.48 
France  0.53  0.85  0.17  0.57  0.25  0.62 
Germany  0.75  0.90  0.51  0.56  0.14  0.33 
Italy  0.49  0.93  -0.02  0.56  0.12  0.51 
Netherlands  0.35  0.93  0.18  0.62  0.03  0.17 
Portugal  0.72  0.59  0.09  0.15  0.36  0.44 
Spain  0.57  0.69  -0.03  0.45  -0.18  -0.28 
 













Bulgaria  0.22  -0.27  0.03  0.31  -0.01  0.36 
Croatia  -0.42  0.54  -0.01  -0.18  0.13  0.19 
Czech Rep.  0.37  0.34  0.11  0.15  -0.27  0.17 
Estonia  -0.34  0.46  0.45  0.01  -0.03  0.00 
Hungary  0.21  -0.22  0.10  0.27  0.28  -0.16 
Latvia  -0.32  0.08  0.17  -0.17  -0.16  -0.22 
Lithuania  -0.67  -0.07  0.34  -0.19  -0.11  -0.19 
Poland  0.27  0.80  -0.34  0.02  0.06  0.71 
Romania  -0.38  0.15  0.05  0.59  -0.28  -0.01 
Slovakia  0.34  0.58  -0.40  -0.48  0.22  0.20 
Slovenia  -0.41  0.39  -0.08  0.11  -0.11  -0.53 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The shocks of EU adhesion has decreased the correlation coefficients in the Baltic countries, 
but increased in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. In the Czech and Slovak Republic, the supply 
shocks correlation has shown only small changes. It is interesting to notice that supply shocks have 
become more correlated in the “future” new EU countries – Bulgaria and Romania, but the opposite 
can be  remarked for a  country that  did  not  enter to  the EU in  2007  –  Croatia. A similar, i.e. 
heterogeneous,  pattern  emerges  for  real  demand  shocks.  Indeed,  even  if  the  impact  of  the  EU 
                                                           
22 The real GDP growth correlation is reported here as a proxy for business cycles correlation between two zones. In 
general, growth correlation coefficients are higher than these of supply shocks, but the similarity in both correlation 




enlargement is less visible, their correlation has increased in the case of the Czech Republic and 
Poland and decreased in Hungary and Slovenia. When looking at the nominal shocks correlation, 
we  can  notice  a  general  decrease  in  the  correlation  coefficients.  This  is  undoubtedly  due  to 
monetary policy reaction on the EU enlargement shock. Indeed, this temporary increase in “fiscal” 
and  “monetary”  policies  shocks  can  also  be  notice  when  the  dynamics  of  demand  shocks  is 
analyzed (Figure 2 - 3).  
In all, the impact of EU enlargement on the shocks, especially real shocks, correlation is 
rather mitigated: negative in the case of the Baltic countries, positive in Poland and Slovenia. For 
the other CEECs, namely the Czech and Slovak Republic, the impact of EU enlargement is more 
difficult to depict. Data span is too short to measure the initial impact of the euro adoption in 
Slovenia. However, we can try to assess the impact of monetary integration on shocks correlation. 
 
4.3. Can monetary integration increase shocks correlation? 
While from a theoretical point of view it is not clear that EMU integration has increased the 
similarity of the shocks among its participant
23, previous empirical evidence has pointed o ut that 
with the birth of the EMU business cycle synchronization has increased. In this paragraph, we re -
examine this issue, from static and dynamic point of views, with most recent data and disentangling 
between types of shocks. 
Starting with supply shocks
24 (Table 4, upper part), we remark general increase in these 
shocks correlation for all actual EMU countries, except Germany where supply shocks correlation 
was already significant (0.51) before the euro adoption. When we look at real demand shocks, a 
                                                           
23 See Introduction.  
24 We analyze especially the impact of monetary integration  on real structural shocks, since the frequency of nominal 




similar pattern can be noticed for all studied countries except Finland and Spain. However, the 
impact of EMU creation on real demand shocks is less significant.  
From a dynamics point of view, it is possible to notice a general increase in supply shocks 
convergence (Figure 4) toward the common European level during the first phase of monetary 
integration (1992-1993) and since at least the beginning o the EMU in 1999. For some countries, 
this second increase in convergence has started earlier (Finland in 1995, Spain in1996, the 
Netherlands in 1997), for others, such as Italy or Portugal, latter, i.e. after 2001. 
However, some cyclical increase in shock divergence could be noticed for example in 2003 
and 2005, undoubtedly because of the impact of the EU enlargement to the Est.  
In the case of real demand shocks (Figure 5), it is possible to remark a general convergence 
trend  between  all  studied  countries  except  Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  However,  this  increasing 
convergence is also linked to economic fluctuation and progress in political integration in Europe. 
For example, we notice a general divergence in real demand shocks pattern over the 1994-1997 
period and a general convergence since the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
until at least the end of 2000. Moreover, since 2001, especially in the second semester of 2003 and 
2005, real shocks convergence increased with the recovery of European growth.  
During the period preceding the EMU creation, nominal demand shocks dynamics was very 
heterogeneous. Indeed, despite a visible progress in shocks convergence until the second half of 
1995,  stabilization  phase  and  growing  divergence  since  the  first  quarter  of  1997,  it  is  rather 
impossible to find a common pattern of nominal shocks correlation.  The year 1996, when the 
greatest progress in nominal shocks correlation was made, can be considered as an exception. These 
findings confirm the thesis that monetary policies of the member states were actively used during 
the phases of preparation, especially the last one, to complete monetary integration
25. Moreover,  
                                                           




Figure 7:  Convergence of Supply Shocks toward the Euro Zone as opposed to the US: the actual EMU members 
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Figure 9:  Convergence of Nominal Shocks toward the Euro Zone as opposed to the US: the actual EMU members 
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positive or highly positive correlation coefficients for almost all countries
26  over the 1990-1998 
period, corroborates the fact about the existing considerable symmetry of these economies.  
 
 5. Conclusion 
In this work we tried to determine how the degree of asymmetry between the CEECs’ and 
euro zone economies has changed over the recent period taking into account the initial impact of 
EU  enlargement  and  the  potential  impact  of  monetary  integration.  We  focused  especially  on 
structural shocks affecting these economies analyzing the dynamic of their correlation, but also 
study the response of the CEECs’ economies to symmetric shocks. To this purpose, we estimated 
VAR models imposing the long-term restrictions and carried out a space-state model using the 
Kalman filter technique. 
Our  estimation  results  corroborate  the  usual  findings  about  progress  in  supply  shocks 
convergence between the CEECs and the euro zone, but also confirm a positive initial impact of the 
EU  enlargement  in  May  2004  on  almost  all  countries.  However  since  2006,  an  increasing 
divergence in supply shocks could be noticed in some countries (especially for Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and the Baltic economies). We found a similar development in the case of 
nominal demand shocks, namely a general increase of shocks convergence during the majority of 
studied  period,  but  also  recent  (since  2005/2006)  growing  divergence  for  almost  all  countries, 
which  should  disappear  with  the  euro  adoption.  In  the  case  of  real  demand  shocks,  we  found 
however more heterogeneous pattern of convergence and weaker correlation between two zones.  
When  compared  to  the  previous  experience,  we  found  that  monetary  integration  has  a 
positive  impact  on  the  real  supply  shocks  correlations,  which  confirms  that  in  the  case  of  the 
CEECs, supply shocks convergence and symmetry can increase with the euro adoption. The past 
                                                           




experience however did not let confirm the same evolution about real demand shocks. Indeed, even 
if these shocks symmetry seemed to increase with fiscal integration within the monetary union, real 
demand shocks have stayed less weakly correlated than supply ones and their divergence seems to 
be more affected by cyclical fluctuations.  
In all, we found that Croatia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia can be considerate as good 
candidates to the euro adoption. Indeed, even if all CEECs’ economies are affected in the greatest 
part by real supply shocks, these countries supply shocks have shown the most visible increase in 
convergence toward the euro zone level. Moreover, once the shock of EMU adhesion (and in the 
case of Croatia, EU adhesion) absorber, the supply shocks correlation will probably increase as in 
the case of the actual EMU members. However, all these countries should increase coordination of 
their fiscal policies (real demand shocks symmetry).  
In the case of the other countries and especially Hungary and the Baltic Republics, the euro 
adoption should be postponed to the achievement of greater shocks correlation. Indeed, it seems that 
their economies are touched by asymmetric shocks and some independence of monetary policies is 
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Table A-1: Exchange Rate Regimes in the CEECs 
Bulgaria 
Managed Floating since Feb 1991 
Currency Board peg to Euro (DM) since July 1997 
Croatia 
Fixed Peg since 1992 
Managed Floating since Oct 1993 
Czech Rep.  Managed Floating since May 1997 
Estonia 
Currency Board peg to euro (DM) since Jan 1996 
ERM 2 since June 2004 
Hungary 
Fixed Exchange Rate to the Basket of Currencies since Dec 1991 
Crawling peg/band to basket (+/- 2.25% bands) since Mar 1995 
To Euro since Jan 2000, +/- 15% bands since May 2001 
Floating since the end of 2003 
Latvia 
Fixed Exchange Rate peg to SDR since 1994 (+/-1%) 
Peg to euro since Jan 2005, ERM 2 since May 2005 
Lithuania 
Currency Board peg to USD since Apr 1994 
Peg to Euro since Feb 2002, ERM 2 since Jun 2004 
Poland 
Fixed Exchange Rate peg to basket since May 1991 
Crawling peg/band to basket since Oct 1991 
Bands widened since Mar 1995 (+/-2.0%) to Mar 1999 (+/-15%) 
Free Floating since Apr 2000 
Romania  Managed Floating since Aug 1992 
Slovakia 
Fixed Exchange Rate peg to basket since Jan 1991 
Bands widened since Jan 1996 (+/-3%) and since Jan 1997 (+/- 7%) 
Managed Floating since Oct 1998, ERM 2 since Nov 2005 
Euro adoption Jan 2009 
Slovenia 
Managed Floating since Oct 1991 
ERM 2 since Jun 2004, Euro adoption Jan 2007 
 









Table A-2: Openness Rate* among the EU countries 
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Austria  51.7  56.7  59.4  59.0  61.2  64.3  63.3  64.3  66.8  65.9 
Belgium  102.4  116.3  119.4  121.5  119.1  123.4  129.4  133.7  135.6  137.6 
Finland  38.1  42.7  39.0  37.9  37.0  37.2  39.1  42.2  42.0  40.1 
France  29.4  33.1  32.0  30.2  30.0  30.3  29.6  30.9  30.2  29.9 
Germany  31.2  35.2  35.8  35.1  36.3  38.4  40.3  44.0  46.3  46.5 
Italy  24.6  26.7  26.4  25.32  24.8  25.4  25.7  27.3  27.5  26.6 
Netherlands  72.2  79.2  74.9  72.1  71.0  74.5  78.9  84.7  87.1  89.1 
Portugal  42.0  44.6  43.1  41.5  40.4  39.6  41.7  43.0  44.0  43.9 
Spain  27.8  32.6  31.7  30.2  29.6  29.8  28.8  28.7  29.5  25.5 
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Bulgaria  40.8  48.9  53.2  51.9  54.9  58.3  61.1  65.6  72.7  68.9 
Czech Rep.  74.9  86.3  90.4  82.6  86.8  105.9  103.6  109.8  114.3  106.6 
Estonia  80.6  103.1  89.5  83.3  80.8  90.9  100.4  99.4  95.7  91.8 
Hungary  85.8  93.5  89.6  80.4  79.5  85.7  88.3  101.4  102.0  101.0 
Latvia  49.3  49.6  50.8  52.5  55.4  60.9  64.9  65.9  61.8  55.8 
Lithuania  44.2  48.4  53.1  55.5  52.4  62.5  65.5  70.3  71.3  67.3 
Poland  33.0  34.7  33.8  36.3  42.2  50.3  48.3  52.7  54.5  51.8 
Romania  37.6  42.9  46.8  48.8  49.8  51.5  45.2  45.0  46.7  45.7 
Slovakia  85.9  96.2  104.5  101.7  106.6  112.5  114.4  125.3  126.6  n.a. 
Slovenia  64.0  71.4  70.8  67.2  66.2  75.9  81.9  89.0  93.4  90.7 
*Openness rate is computed as follows: Intra-union exports+ Intra-union imports/ GDP  
Source: Eurostat, Author’s calculations 





Table A-3: The space-state model estimation results (mean values) 
 
Real Supply Shocks




α  β  α  β  α  β 
Austria  -0.17*  0.28***  -0.09*  0.19***  -0.15**  0.38*** 
Belgium  -0.19***  0.14***  -0.03*  -0.01*  -0.42***  0.55*** 
Finland  -0.18*  0.11**  -0.09*  0.19***  -0.28***  0.50*** 
France  0.35***  0.20***  0.17***  0.05*  -0.36***  0.50*** 
Germany  0.7  0.50***  -0.13**  0.10*  -0.09  0.45*** 
Italy  0.36***  0.26***  0.23***  0.85***  -0.46***  0.42*** 
Netherlands  0.25***  0.70***  -0.56***  0.41***  0.33***  0.63*** 
Portugal  0.12*  0.38***  -0.05  0.16**  -0.43***  0.39*** 
Spain  0.01  0.05*  -0.03  0.22***  -0.85***  0.64*** 
 
Real Supply Shocks  Real Demand Shocks 
Nominal Demand 
Shocks 
α  β  α  β  α  β 
Bulgaria  -0.18***  -0.49***  0.52***  0.57***  -0.45***  0.23*** 
Croatia
3  -0.50***  0.26***  0.19***  0.52***  -0.35***  0.58*** 
Czech Rep.  -0.14**  0.78***  0.43***  0.27***  0.17***  0.73*** 
Estonia  0.20***  0.38***  0.21***  0.40***  -0.11  0.04* 
Hungary  0.13*  0.48***  -0.02  0.64***  0.77***  0.23*** 
Latvia  0.35***  0.48***  -0.06  0.57***  -0.38***  0.11* 
Lithuania  0.17***  0.51***  0.14*  0.53***  -0.32***  0.07* 
Poland  0.32***  0.31***  -0.27***  0.02***  0.70***  0.20*** 
Romania
3  0.44***  -0.00*  -0.19**  0.35***  0.20**  0.45*** 
Slovakia
4  -0.35***  -0.20***  0.30***  0.66***  0.36***  0.20*** 
Slovenia  0.77***  -0.17***  -0.16***  0.44***  0.33***  0.34*** 
1 the Q1:1990-Q4:2007 estimation period                  
2 Q1:1990-Q4:1998 
3 Q1:1997-Q4:2007    
4 Q1:1995 –Q4: 2006 for nominal shocks 
***/**/* siginigicant resectively at the 1, 5, 10% level 
Source: Author’s estimations 
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